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Wills, Probate and Real Property Law
By FRANCES E. CATRON*
Then a lawyer said, "But what of out Laws,
master?"
And he answered:
You delight in laying down laws,
Yet you delight more in breaking them.
Like children playing by the ocean who
build sand-towers with constancy and then
destroy them with laughter.
But while you build your sand-towers the
ocean brings more sand to the shore,
And when you destroy them the ocean
laughs with you.
Verily, the ocean laughs always with the
innocent.I
That lawyers and law-makers do not always realize the con-
sequences of changes in the law is particularly true when con-
sidered in light of the developments during the Survey period2 in
Kentucky wills, probate and real property law. Significant de-
velopments have occurred in both the state's statutory3 and case
. J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1983. The author expresses her apprecia-
tion to Gerald P Johnston, Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this Survey.
1 K. GIBRAN, On Laws, THE PROPHET (1923).
2 This Survey reviews cases decided from August of 1980 to July of 1982.
3 The 1982 General Assembly revised numerous sections of Kentucky Revised Sta-
tutes chapters 381, 382, 385, 387, 389, 391, 394 and 395, which are relevant to this Sur-
vey.
Revisions and court interpretations of Kentucky's estate and probate statutes not
discussed in detail in this Survey include:
(1) Gregory v. Allstate Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (an estate is
not entitled to recover "work-loss" under the no-fault benefits of KY. REV. STAT. SS
304.39-020(5)(b), .39-030(1) (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS];
(2) United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. McEnroe, 610 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1980)
(an administrator is not a "survivor" under the Kentucky Motor Vehicles Reparations Act,
KBS § 304.39-020(5), (14), .39-030(1), 411.130 (1972)).
(3) KRS chapter 387, amended throughout to recognize partial disability to man-
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law. 4 However, in view of the numerous significant amendments
to the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) made by the 1982 Gen-
eral Assembly, this Survey will discuss the statutory changes in
wills, probate and real property law separately from the modifi-
cations in the case law.
I. AMENDMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES
A. Wills and Probate Law
The 1982 Kentucky General Assembly heeded some well-
deserved criticism5 and amended KRS section 394.225 to clarify
age one's person and financial affairs, and to establish policy guidelines to use in determin-
ing the necessity of a guardianship or conservatorship for the well-being of the partially
disabled person;
(4) KRS § 386.180 (Cum. Supp. 1982), amended to raise the maximum fees pay-
able to trustees of estates to six percent of the collected income, and to raise the maximum
annual commission to .3 percent of the trust property value;
(5) KRS § 386.185 (Cum. Supp. 1982), raising the maximum value of a trust
which may be terminated by petition of the fiduciary to the court to $15,000;
(6) Preece v. Adams, 616 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), discretionary rev.
granted, 609 S.W.2d 368, vacated, 616 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1981) (one year statute of limita-
tions contained in KRS § 395.278 (Cum. Supp. 1982) for revival of an action for an estate
is tolled by the filing of a motion to revive even if the motion is subsequently dismissed). In
the order vacating the grant of discretionary review, former Chief Justice Palmore and
present Chief Justice Stephens wrote concurring and dissenting opinions, respectively, for
publication debating the propriety of allowing KY. R. Civ. P. 15.03 to avoid a revivor stat-
ute; and
(7) KRS § 395.500 (Cum. Supp. 1982), amended to allow an order dispensing
with the administration of a small estate to be set aside only within one year of the dispens-
ing order instead of the previous five-year limit. Other amendments were made to chapter
395 in order to clarify prior language or to slightly amend the statute. See KRS §§
395.001, .016, .040, .155, .200, .380, .390, .455, .470, .600, .610 (Cum. Supp. 1982)
(variously effective July 1, July 15, 1982).
4 For a discussion of the changes in Kentucky case law during the Survey period, see
text accompanying notes 48-97 infra.
5 When the Ceneral Assembly first provided for self-proving wills in 1974, many
practitioners apparently misunderstood the statute and failed to have the will first attested
and executed, then self-proved. Instead, they used the self-proving provision in the statute
as a substitute for an attestation clause, although the statute stated that only "attested
wills" may be self-proved. Consequently, wills were faultily executed, rendering them in-
valid. For specitic criticism leveled at the former statute, see Schneider, Self-Proved Wills
in Kentucky: Problems and Recommendations, 45 KY. BENCH & B., Jan. 1981, at 22;
Schneider, Self-Proved Wills-A Trap for the Unwary, 8 N. KY. L. RBv. 539 (1981).
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the self-proving will provisions and to prevent the potentially dis-
astrous consequences to decedents' wills that were faultily ex-
ecuted because of a misunderstanding of former KRS section
394.225. 6 The new provisions establish two alternative methods
by which a will may be self-proved-simultaneously with its ex-
ecution or subsequent to its execution. The simultaneous self-
proving and execution alternative involves a one-step procedure
combining the basic elements of a signatory clause, an attestation
clause and a notarization provision.7 The subsequent-to-execu-
tion alternative is based upon the former self-proving provision,
now clarified to remove all doubt that the will must first be ex-
ecuted and attested, then self-proved. 8 Both new provisions are
taken almost verbatim from the 1975 amendments to the Uni-
form Probate Code. 9
To validate wills that may have been improperly executed
under the old self-proving provisions, the General Assembly in-
cluded KRS section 394.225(3) 10 as a savings clause. Subsection
(3) is intended to prevent distribution of an estate under intestacy
6 Former KRS § 394.225(1) (enacted in 1974, amended July 15, 1982) reads in
pertinent part:
An attested will may, at the time of its execution or at any subsequent date,
be made self-proved, by the acknowledgement thereof by the testator and
the affidavits of the witnesses, each made before an officer authorized to ad-
minister oaths under the laws of this state, and evidenced by the officer's cer-
tificate, attached or amended to the will in form and content substantially as
follows: [form deleted].
7 The General Assembly set forth an example of a combination of self-proving/attes-
tation provision in the new statute. See KRS § 394.225(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
8 New KRS § 394.225(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982) states: "An attested will may, at any
time subsequent to its execution be made self-proved .... (Emphasis added). The state-
ment of the notarizing officer was also accordingly modified.
9 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-504,8 U.L.A. 138-39 (Supp. 1982).
10 Subsection (3) states:
The execution of an acknowledgment of a will by a testator, and of the
affidavits of witnesses, made before an officer authorized to administer
oaths under the laws of this state and evidenced by the officer's certificate
substantially in the form set out in this section during the period between
June 21, 1974 and the effective date of the 1982 amendments to this section
shall be considered to be a valid execution and attestation of a written will
even though the will was not signed and attested separately from the execu-
tion of the acknowledgment by the testator and the affidavits of the wit-
nesses.
KRS § 394.225(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
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statutes due to the invalidity of a will, if the invalidity is a direct
result of a misapplication of the self-proving provisions of former
KRS section 394.225. As of this writing, there are no reported
Kentucky cases where such an invalid will has been denied ad-
mission to probate due to improper application of the self-prov-
ing provisions, but the identical issue has arisen a number of
times in other jurisdictions, often with unfortunate conse-
quences." Because KRS section 394.225 has been clarified, the
original strong policy reasons behind self-proving wills 12 should
encourage the routine use of self-proving provisions in all Ken-
tucky wills.
The 1982 General Assembly took another positive corrective
step by repealing KRS section 394.095, which had served to re-
voke a prior executed will upon the testator's divorce.13 It was re-
placed by KRS section 394.092, which serves only as a partial
revocation in such circumstances, causing the will to be inter-
preted as if the former spouse had predeceased the maker. 14 Like
n See Schneider, Self-Proved Wils-A Trap for the Unwary, supra note 5, at 539,
for a discussion of the problems encountered in other jurisdictions.
12 The policy behind allowing self-proving wills is that a self-proved will may be ad-
mitted to probate without the necessity of the testimony of subscribing witnesses, thus
avoiding the unnecessary expense, delay and trouble of finding subscribing witnesses after
many years.
13 Former KRS § 394.095 (1972), now repealed, revoked a will by action of law
upon the maker's divorce except under one narrow circumstance-a will made in exercise
of a power of appointment when the estate thereby appointed would not pass to the heir,
personal representative or next of kin of the person who made the will if the power were in
default.
14 KRS § 394.092 (Cum. Supp. 1982) reads:
Effect of divorce or annulment of marriage of testator.
(1) If after executing a will the testator is divorced or his marriage an-
nulled, the divorce or annulment revokes any disposition or appointment of
property made by the will to the former spouse, any provision conferring a
general or special power of appointment on the former spouse, and any
nomination of the former spouse as executor, trustee, conservator or guar-
dian, unless the will expressly provides otherwise. Property prevented from
passing to a former spouse because of revocation by divorce or annulment
passes as if the former spouse failed to survive the decedent, and other provi-
sions conferring some power of office on the former spouse are interpreted as
if the spouse failed to survive the decedent. If provisions are revoked solely
by this section, they are revived by the testator's remarriage to the former
spouse.
(2) This section shall apply to wills executed on or after July 15, 1982.
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the amended self-proving provisions in KRS section 394.225,
KRS section 394.092 substantially follows the model statute of
the Uniform Probate Code.1
5
The need for such corrective action was made abundantly
clear in Morse v. Alley, 16 a case that reached the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in April of 1982. In Morse, the court applied the pre-
vious version of the statute to a will executed before the enact-
ment of that statutory provision, thus causing the entire will to
be revoked. This was directly contrary to the express intent of the
testatrix even though the former spouse would only have taken a
token bequest under the will. The application of KRS section
394.095 revoked the will by operation of law, thus causing the
testatrix' estate to pass by intestacy to her two sons equally al-
though her express desire, as reflected in the will, had been to
give all of her estate to one son because the other had previously
been amply provided for by his father, her first husband. The
harshness of the application of the former statute in Morse is ap-
parent, and the new provisions under KRS section 304.092
should rectify the situation.
Another area of interest involves will contracts. Although not
part of the legislation enacted by the 1982 General Assembly,
KRS section 394.540, which was adopted in 1972, also was taken
from the Uniform Probate Code17 and was judicially interpreted
for the first time in Kentucky in Martin v. Cassady. 18 In Martin,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals strictly interpreted KRS section
394.540,11 which lists the requirements for proving a will con-
15 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508,8 U.L.A. 353 (1972).
16 638 S.W.2d 284 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), discretionary rev. denied, No. 82-SC-411-D
(Ky. Oct. 5, 1982).
17 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-701, 8 U.L.A. 364 (1972).
'8 628 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
19 KRS § 394.540, enacted in 1972, provides:
(1) A contract to make a will or devise, or not to revoke a will or devise, or
to die intestate, if executed after June 16, 1972, can be established only by:
(a) Provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract;
(b) An express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evi-
dence proving the terms of the contract; or
(c) A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
(2) The execution of a joint will or mutual will gives rise to no presumption
of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.
1982-83]
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tract. This strict interpretation contravenes Kentucky case law
prior to the statute's enactment. In Martin, a husband and wife
executed a joint will, which in Kentucky has historically been
evidence of a will contract, after the enactment of the statute.
Upon the wife's death, the joint will was probated. Subsequent-
ly, the husband executed a codicil changing the executor of the
will. The new executor was qualified to administer the estate
upon the husband's death.
In upholding this action, the court of appeals interpreted the
statute to "mean that no longer will mutual or joint wills be con-
sidered to constitute an irrevocable contract unless the will by its
terms states plainly that its provisions are to be considered as a
contract, or unless the conditions of subsections (b) and (c) of the
statute are met."2 In other words, Martin affirms that the statute
changed previous law as to what constitutes a contract. The
holding overturns Kentucky law which, prior to the enactment
of the statute, had "uniformly held that a joint or mutual will
could not be altered by the surviving spouse," 2' based upon the
view that the reciprocal provisions themselves constituted a con-
tract. Although joint wills and will contracts enjoy only limited
use, the practitioner should be aware of this statute and its strict
interpretation, and counsel clients contemplating joint wills or
will contracts of its effect. If a will contract is desired, it can no
longer be accomplished by mere reliance on the existence of joint
or mutual wills without further substantial evidence of an intent
to make a will contract.
Although the 1982 General Assembly followed the example
of the Uniform Probate Code in amending many sections of Ken-
tucky's probate and intestacy law, it departed radically from the
model provisions regarding the family allowance set aside for the
surviving spouse and children during the administration of a de-
cedent's estate. KRS section 391.030, as amended by the 1982
General Assembly, excludes a surviving spouse who has re-
nounced the will, thereby preventing the spouse from obtaining
Martin v. Cassady, 628 S.W.2d at 890. For the text of KRS § 394.540(1)(b), (c),
see note 19 supra.
21 628 S.W.2d at 890.
[Vol. 71
WILLS, PROBATE AND REAL PROPERTY
a previously available family allowance. The new amendment
does, however, raise the total amount of the allowance available
to the surviving spouse of an intestate from $5,000 to $7,500.23
The inflationary pressures prompting the General Assembly
to raise the allowance are easily understood, but the reasons for
denying an allowance to a renouncing spouse are not. The policy
behind exempting a portion of the personal property from the
claims of creditors is to protect the family and provide reasonable
maintenance during the administration of the estate. This policy
is just as applicable to decedents' families where the surviving
spouse has renounced the will as it is to the families of intestate
decedents. Irrespective of this inconsistency, the General Assem-
bly has seen fit to remove this protection from the families of
decedents where the surviving spouse has renounced the will. It
should be noted that the $1,000 cash withdrawal allowed under
the statute is charged against the total $7,500 exemption so that a
surviving spouse not entitled to the personal property exemption
also is not entitled to the cash withdrawal.2 The statute seems to
act as a punitive measure seeking to discourage a surviving spouse
from renouncing a will. A surviving spouse who is considering re-
nouncing the will should be advised of potential financial prob-
lems.21
22KRS § 391.030, as amended, deletes subsection (4) which previously allowed:
(4) This [family allowance] section applies to cases where the husband
or wife dies testate and the surviving spouse renounces the provisions of the
will as provided in KRS § 392.080.
KRS § 391.030 (1972) (repealed 1982).
21 KRS § 391.030(3) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
24 Contrary to the example of the Uniform Probate Code, UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-
402, 8 U.L.A. 344, 345 (1972), Kentucky statutes do not provide a maintenance allowance
for the family of a testate decedent whose spouse has not renounced the will. A testate de-
cedent's family faces financial burdens during the administration of the estate similar to
those of an intestate family; the decedents assets are tied up in the administration of the
estate and are unavailable for support of the family. Although denying a family allowance
to a renouncing spouse would equalize the positions of a renouncing spouse with a non-re-
nouncing spouse (both denied a family allowance), the more charitable position would be
to allow the family of any decedent a portion of the personal property to provide for neces-
sary support during the administration of the estate.
25 A renouncing spouse would not be entitled to the statutes personal property
exemption, and by renouncing the will, has renounced any bequests of personal property
made in the will. Therefore, the surviving spouse has no immediate access to the dece-
dent's personal property to use for support.
1982-83]
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B. Real Property Law
The 1982 General Assembly also made a number of statutory
revisions in the area of real property. The most novel amendment
was the addition of KRS section 381.200(2), which specifically
provides for the creation of solar easements. The stated legisla-
tive purpose for allowing the creation of a solar easement is "en-
suring access to direct sunlight."26 At a time when solar energy
plays a growing part in the energy future, the General Assem-
bly's allowance for such an easement seems enlightened. How-
ever, the restrictions imposed by the statute betray the General
Assembly's true intent. The statute provides that a solar easement
"shall be created in writing" and "shall be subject to the same re-
cording and conveyancing requirements," and that a solar ease-
ment "shall not be acquired by prescription." z In actuality, KRS
section 381.200(2) restricts the creation of solar easements. The
General Assembly has presumably observed the movement in
other states toward the recognition of solar easements and has
acted to limit their application in Kentucky.2s By coincidence, a
significant Wisconsin Supreme Court case29 dealing with solar
easements was argued shortly before KRS section 381.200(2) was
2 KRS § 381.200(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982) reads:
A solar easement may be obtained for the purpose of ensuring access to
direct sunlight. Such easement shall be created in writing and shall be an in-
terest in real property that may be acquired and transferred and shall be
subject to the same recording and conveyancing requirements, except that a
solar easement shall not be acquired by prescription.
27 Id.
2' The strong policy reason behind allowing solar easements is the need to utilize all
available forms of energy, especially a clean and readily available source such as solar
energy in the struggle to replace our dwindling energy supply. Owners of solar panels and
solar collectors need legal protection to insure continued access to sunlight. For a discus-
sion of methods of protecting access to sunlight and the movement among states to recog-
nize. solar easements, see Note, Obtaining Access to Solar Energy: Nuisance, Water
Rights, and Zoning Administration, 45 BROOicLYN L. REv. 357 (1979); Note, The Alloca-
tion of Sunlight: Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, U. CoLo. L. REv. 421
(1976); Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CAL. L. REv. 94
(1977); Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REv. 94
(1977).
29 Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982) (argued March 29, 1982; decided
July 2, 1982).
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approved by the General AssemblyO and was decided in favor of
solar easements.
The Wisconsin case, Prah v. Maretti,31 identified three ways
to secure a solar easement: (1) under the common law private
nuisance doctrine of reasonable use, (2) under the doctrine of
prior appropriation and (3) under a statutory right in Wiscon-
sin. 2 The doctrine of prior appropriation (the first user to appro-
priate the resource has the right of continued use to the exclusion
of others) has been used predominantly by the western states to
allocate scarce resources such as water. 3 Because of Kentucky's
abundance of natural resources, the doctrine of prior appropri-
ation has not been recognized in this state.Y Absent a move at
this late date by the Kentucky courts to recognize the doctrine of
prior appropriation, the judicial creation of a solar easement
would have to arise from tort law (private nuisance) or from the
old English common law doctrine of "ancient lights,"' ' which the
Prah court discusses but does not adopt. The doctrine of ancient
lights is based upon the theory of negative prescriptive ease-
ments.- If a landowner has received sunlight across adjacent
property for a certain lengthy period of time, the landowner is
entitled to continue receiving unobstructed sunlight across the
adjoining property. 37 At present no American state recognizes the
common law doctrine of "ancient lights,"s and the action of the
Kentucky General Assembly apparently guarantees that the Ken-
tucky courts will keep it that way. The General Assembly has
blocked whatever inclination a Kentucky court may have had to-
' The General Assembly approved the amendment April 1, 1982, and the amend-
ment became effective July 15, 1982.
31 321 N.W.2d at 182.
32 Id. at 186. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 844.01 (West 1977) allows an action for interference
with an interest In real property.
33 321 N.W.2d at 186.
34 This is not to say Kentucky has not recognized doctrines allowing for prescriptive
rights to resources such as water, but the rights acquired have not been exclusive. Cf. Riley
v. Jones, 174 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1943); McPherson v. Thompson, 89 S.W. 195 (Ky. 1905).
3 For a general discussion of the doctrine of ancient lights, see Pfeiffer, Ancient
Lights: Legal Protection of Access to Solar Energy, 68 A.B.A. J. 288 (1982).
3 Id. at 289.
37 321 N.W.2d at 188.
38 Id. at 188 n.8 (citing Comment, Solar Lights: Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57
OR. L. REv. 94,112 (1977)).
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ward the doctrine of "ancient lights" by mandating in KRS sec-
tion 381.200(2) that a "solar easement shall not be acquired by
prescription." 39
Although the Kentucky General Assembly has eliminated one
doctrine through which the courts could recognize common law
solar easements, the legislature did not neutralize all judicial
doctrine which could give rise to such easements. The reasonable
use doctrine of private nuisance law, as discussed in Prah, has
historically been available to landowners to resolve difficulties
resulting from the use of one landowner's property to the detri-
ment of his neighbor. 40 Under private nuisance law, a landowner
is liable for using his or her land in a manner which unreasonably
invades a neighbor's right to use and enjoy his or her own land.41
For example, construction that blocks a neighbor's solar panels
could constitute a use of the land that unreasonably invades an
adjoining property owner's rights if the invasion is unreason-
able.42 The Wisconsin court in Prah grounded its recognition of a
cause of action to establish a solar easement on this unreasonable
use standard of private nuisance law. 43 The Kentucky courts, if
called upon, may do likewise and possibly avoid conflict with the
General Assembly's mandate in the new KRS section 381.200(2).
C. Miscellaneous Statutory Changes
The General Assembly also made several unrelated amend-
ments to various chapters, one of which is particularly note-
39 KRS § 381.200(2) (Cum. Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
4o See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d at 187-91.
41 See id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 882 (1977) provides the general rule
for private nuisance:
One is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is
a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoy-
ment of land, and the invasion is either
(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liabil-
ity for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions
or activities.42 "Reasonableness" and "unreasonableness" enjoy the flexibility needed in various
situations where a trier of fact needs to use discretion in weighing all the surrounding cir-
curnstances. However, reasonableness is one of those nebulous concepts which the law em-
ploys but which gives few objective guidelines to the trier of fact.
43 321 N.W.2d at 191.
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worthy. KRS section 389A.030 was amended to exclude tenants
by the entirety from bringing an action for the sale or division of
property when the realty is residential and actually occupied by
them as a principal residence." In most respects, Kentucky treats
tenants by the entirety, joint tenants and tenants in common as
having equal partition rights, contrary to common law. 45 The
General Assembly has chosen to exclude tenants by the entirety
from the involuntary partition procedure provided for in KRS
section 389A.030 if the property to be divided is the husband's
and wife's principal residence. 46 However, the new provision
does not seem to amend or restrict in any way the process fol-
lowed by a court of dissolution in dividing marital property be-
tween the parties incidental to a marital dissolution proceeding. 47
44 KRS § 389A.030(1) (Cum. Supp. 1982).
45 See KRS § 381.050, .120, .135 and 389A.030 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
48 KRS § 389.030(1) reads in pertinent part:
When two (2) or more persons other than tenants by the entirety in residen-
tial property occupied by them as a principal residence share title to real
estate in such a manner that a conveyance by them jointly would pass a fee
simple title, any one or more of them may bring an action for the sale or di-
vision thereof in the circuit court of the county in which the land, or the
greater part thereof lies, making parties defendant those owners who have
not joined as plaintiffs.
(Emphasis added).
47 See KRS S 403.190 (Cun. Supp. 1982) for the procedure a dissolution court uses
to divide marital property. All marital property is subject to the same procedure regardless
of how title is held.
Other amendments worth mentioning include the General Assembly's modifica-
tion of the process of recording instruments retaining liens by amending KRS § 382.290
(1972). The county clerk has the option under the new statute of keeping a marginal entry
record to record each note or obligation named in the deed or mortgage instead of noting
each one immediately following the record of the deed or mortgage. Along with KRS §
382.290, housekeeping amendments were made to KItS M§ 382.360, .470 and .520, re-
fleeting the same changes.
Additionally, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided an interesting case dealing
with the valid recordation of mechanic's liens in Hub City Wholesale Elec., Inc. v. Mik-
Beth Elee. Co., 621 S.W.2d 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary rev. denied, No. 81-
SC-489-D (Ky. Oct. 6, 1981). The court held that KRS § 376.080 (1972) mandated that
the instruments recording mechanies liens must be subscribed and sworn to be valid al-
though KRS § 423.200 (1972) removed the requirement that instruments be sworn to in
order to be recorded. 621 S.W.2d at 243. This holding would seem to fly in the face of the
purpose for recording a lien, that is, giving notice of a potential priority, as opposed to
verifying the validity of the lien. For a general discussion of mechanics' liens in Kentucky,
see Coleman & Peltier, Mechanics' Liens, 68 Ky. L.J. 681 (1979-80).
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II. THE CASE LAW
A. Estate and Probate Law
While the General Assembly was vigorously changing Ken-
tucky law, the Kentucky Supreme- Court was clinging to the
common law in the best of judicial traditions. In doing so, the
Court vindicated all property professors who hammered into the
heads of first year law students such dinosaurs as the Statute of
Uses, the Statute of Wills and the ever-present Rule against Per-
petuities.48 Hatcher v. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary
49
serves to remind Kentucky practitioners that Old English com-
mon law doctrines are viable.
In Hatcher, the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed these
three historical doctrines in the process of deciding that the
corpus of a charitable trust consisting of corporate stock was not
an invalid "dry" or "passive" trust.2° The Court also reaffirmed
48 In case your property professor failed to hammer quite as hard as the property
professor of this writer, the English Statute of Uses was passed in 1535 under the reign of
King Henry VIII as a revenue-raising act. The intention was to "execute the use," that is,
vest legal title in the cestui que use. When 0 granted Blackaere "to A and his heirs for the
use of B and his heirs," B took legal title with A serving as a conduit through which legal
title would pass to B. The immediate desired result was the restoration of the feudal inci-
dents to the overlord. However, the Statute of Uses was not effective in reuniting legal and
equitable titles and three major loopholes enabled grantors to avoid the Statute. The Sta-
tute did not apply to a use on a use, to personal property, or to active, as distinguished
from passive, uses. These three loopholes eventually gave rise to modem trust law. J. Cam-
BET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW ON PROPERTY 69-71 (1975).
The Statute of Wills was passed in 1540 as a reaction to the Statute of Uses. Prior
to the Statute of Wills, the use was the primary means of devising land to individuals other
than the heir at law. Because the Statute of Uses destroyed the use as a testamentary de-
vice, the Statute of Wills was forced on the King to allow the execution of a document
which would pass legal title to named devisees. When the requirement that a will be in
writing under the Statute of Wills was coupled with the formality requirements of the Sta-
tute of Frauds (passed in 1676), the modem law of wills acquired the basic requirements
for a valid execution of a will: that it be signed by the testator or at his direction, and that
it be attested and subscribed. See id. at 70,118.
As for the Rule against Perpetuities, Professor Cribbet explains how the Statute of
Uses gave rise to such an incomprehensible directive: "Since executory interests [shifting
and springing uses] were nondestructible it became possible, after the Statute of Uses [re-
member the loopholes?], to tie up property for an indefinite period and dead-hand control
became a distinct reality. This gave rise to the Rule against Perpetuties as a common-law
policy opposed to remoteness of vesting." Id. at 78 n.15.
49 632 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1982).
50 Id. at 252-53. In Hatcher, a testatrix left shares of corporate stock in trust for the
WILLS, PROBATE AND REAL PROPERTY
that the Rule against Perpetuities does not apply to charitable
trusts. 51 Moreover, the Court indicated that any trust, not just a
charitable trust, whose corpus consists of corporate stock will not
be a passive trust because of the powers and fiduciary obligations
conferred on trustees under statutory law. 52 While the Kentucky
Supreme Court may not have intended it to be so, the logical ex-
tension of this argument implies that no trust may fail under the
doctrine of passive trusts because of the duties imposed by statute
on all trustees.
A less infamous but no less troublesome common law rule is
the rule against the conveyance of a mere expectancy of an in-
heritance.s' Roberts v. Conley,"4 involving this rule, presented
the Kentucky Supreme Court with another opportunity to dis-
cuss Old English common law. In Roberts, the testatrix had
loaned money to a daughter and son-in-law over a period of
years. She also entered into a contract with the daughter and her
other children, which provided that the debtor-daughter would
transfer to her siblings any inheritance she received from her
mother's estate in the event she received any inheritance. How-
ever, the testatrix promised to will all of her real and personal
property to the other siblings to the exclusion of the debtor-
daughter. Upon the testatrix' death, a second will was found that
contained provisions inconsistent with the contract. The siblings
brought suit to enforce and compel the debtor-daughter to con-
vey to her siblings the inheritance. The Court, after discussing
the common law origins of the rule against the conveyance of a
seminary with no direction except that the trustee pay the income to the seminary as re-
ceived. There were no time limitations to the trust. This raised the question whether the
trust was "dry" or "passive."
A "dry" or "passive' trust is a trust whose trustee had no duties whatsoever and
only holds bare legal title. The concept of a passive trust originated in the "passive use"
which was subject to execution under the Statute of Uses. See J. CRIBBET, supra note 48, at
72-73.
5' 632 S.W.2d at 252.
52 The powers of trustees are ised at KRS § 386.810 (1972 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
53 The rule against the conveyance of a mere expectancy of an inheritance was de-
rived from a statement made by Lord Coke: [I]f a son and heir bargains and sells the in-
heritance of his father, this is void, because he hath no right in himself." cited in Roberts v.
Conley, 626 S.W.2d 634, 638 (Ky. 1982). The rule is grounded in the principle that one
has no right to convey something not yet in being.
54 Id. at 634.
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mere expectancy of an inheritance, concluded that if the contract
was between the daughter and her siblings, then the rule would
void the contract. However, the Court found that the contract
was actually between the testatrix and her daughter, and since
the testatrix had a right to convey or devise property that she
owned, the rule had no application and the contract was en-
forceable. 5
The Kentucky Supreme Court reminded the Kentucky Court
of Appeals that many old common law doctrines still do apply in
Kentucky in its reversal of Walton v. Lee.56 In Walton, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument accepted by the court of
appeals that the doctrine of conclusive presumption of fertility
should fail in the face of conclusive evidence to the contrary.57
The underlying facts are representative of the facts of cases
where the doctrine is typically addressed: a 76-year-old widow
who had undergone a hysterectomy many years ago tried to con-
vey real estate she had acquired through her father's will al-
though she took title subject to a contingent interest in her chil-
dren. The Court held the title unmarketable. 8 In reaffirming the
doctrine, the Supreme Court flatly adopted the rationalization of
one Kentucky commentator: 59
This rule [conclusive presumption that all living persons are
capable of having issue] has a purpose throughout the property
law system, not merely in perpetuity cases. It is not based upon
either understanding or lack of understanding of scientific
facts but upon the economic need for certainty in property de-
cisions. 60
There can be no doubt now that the common law conclusive pre-
5 The case also contains a good discussion of contracts to make a will or to leave
property by will although it makes no changes in the law. See generally id.
M 634 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1982). The Supreme Court concluded its opinion with the
terse statement: "This opinion is submitted with the sincere hope that brevity begets clar-
ity." Id. at 161.
While this case could easily have been discussed under the subtopic of Property
Law, it was included here because of the discussion of the old common law doctrine.
57 Lee v. Walton, No. 80-CA-2316-MR (Ky. Ct. App. July 10, 1981), rev'd, 634
S.W.2d at 159.
5 634 S.W.2d at 159.
59 Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493 (1959).
60 634 S.W.2d at 161 (quoting Sparks, supra note 59, at 500).
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sumption of fertility is dispositive law in Kentucky.
In another 1982 case, the Kentucky Supreme Court extended
the old common law doctrine applicable in Kentucky-Harvey's
Rule # 1.61 In Ford v. Thomas,6 2 the Court deciphered the lan-
guage of an inartfully drawn will. Under the terms of the will,
the surviving spouse received a life estate and the two children
each received an undivided one-half interest in the remainder
subject to defeasance in favor of the other should one die without
surviving issue. 63 One of the children did in fact die without issue
and his remainder interest passed to his sister. The Court con-
cluded the devise was intended to be:
Testator to... his wife for life, then to his children..., but
if either child should die leaving a child or children, such child
or children shall inherit what was given to their parent. More-
over, if either... [of the children] should die without leaving
a child or children, then the whole of the estate should go to
the survivor ....
The specific issue the Court addressed was the effect of the
language, "if either of the children should die leaving a child or
children, it is my will that such child or children shall take what
is given the parent." The Court concluded that the bare language
of the devise required the extension of Harvey's Rule # 1. Har-
vey's Rule # 1 states in essence that if a remainderman dies with-
out issue during the continuance of the life estate, then the alter-
nate remainderman will take the fee upon termination of the life
estate. The Court decided that in the interest of early vesting of
title, Harvey's Rule # 1 should be extended so that if a remain-
derman dies before the termination of the life estate leaving sur-
viving issue, then the issue will take the fee upon the termination
61 Harvey's Rule # 1 is the Kentucky version of an ancient rule of will construction
discussed in Harvey v. Bell, 81 S.W. 67 (Ky. 1904). Harvey's Rule # 1 states that when
property is devised to one for life with remainder to another, and that when the remain-
derman dies without children or issue, then to another, the words "dying without children
or issue are restricted to the death of the remainderman before the termination of the life
estate." Ford v. Thomas, 633 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1982). Harvey v. Bell promulgated several
rules of construction; the only one which has survived as a namesake is Harvey's Rule # 1.





of the life estate.6 The Court cited the Restatement of Property
section 269 as stating the original rule and supporting its logical
extension:
When property is limited by an otherwise effective con-
veyance "to B for life (or years), remainder to C and his heirs,
but if C dies without issue, then to D," or other words of sim-
ilar import, then, unless a contrary intent of the conveyor is
found from additional language or circumstances, the interest
of D can become a present interest if, but only if, C dies at or
before the time of the termination of the interest of B in accor-
dance with the terms of the limitation, and is unsurvived by
issue at the time of his death. 6
The Court further concluded that Harvey's # 1, as a rule of
construction, must fail if a contrary intent of the testator is dis-
covered from the four corners of the will.6 Accordingly, the ex-
tension also must fail in the face of a contrary intent. The Court
found that the testator intended for his grandchildren, if any, to
be the ultimate beneficiaries and that the daughter had only a fee
subject to being cut off and shifted over to her children if any sur-
vived her. Therefore, the title could not unconditionally vest
until her death.61
Problems in the certification of a clear title to real estate were
presented in Fykes v. Clark.9 The Fykes case holds that an ille-
gitimate posthumous child has the right to attempt to prove pa-
ternity by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, claim a pro-
portionate share of the alleged father's intestate estate.70 The
Fykes case was precipitated by a void created in Kentucky law
after the Kentucky Supreme Court declared KRS section 391.090
unconstitutional. 7 Until its invalidity, KRS section 391.090 acted
to cut off inheritance by an illegitimate child from his or her
father if the child had not been legitimized through the subse-
6Id. at 60.
6 Id. at 60 n.1 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 269 (1940)).
67 633 S.W.2d at 60.
68 Id.
69 635 S.W.2d,316 (Ky. 1982).
70 Id. at 317.
71 Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1978).
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quent marriage of the parents to each other. In Trimble v.
Gordon,72 the United States Supreme Court declared an Illinois
statute substantially similar to KRS section 391.090 unconstitu-
tional, in effect mandating that the Kentucky Supreme Court do
likewise with KRS section 391.090.
The Kentucky Supreme Court pointed out three serious
problems created by the invalidity of KRS section 391.090 and
the ultimate holding in Fykes: (1) uncertainty in the certification
of title to real estate passing from a decedent's estate, (2) preven-
tion of prompt and orderly settlement of estates and (3) probable
increase in spurious and fraudulent claims against the estate. 73
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a state has
a legitimate state interest in preventing these problems, 74 and has
held that a state statute which strives to protect the legitimate
state interest and which bears "an evident and substantial rela-
tion to the particular state interests" is valid.75 The General As-
sembly has not seen fit to replace former KRS section 391.090
with another statute serving the same legitimate state purposes.
Because the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized that this
problem area was one properly addressed by the General Assem-
bly, it was powerless to do anything to resolve it in Fykes.76 Con-
sequently, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued a plea for action
to the General Assembly to fill the void in Kentucky law and pro-
tect these important state interests. 77 Until the General Assembly
does so, Kentucky practitioners must be alert to potential prob-
lems surrounding this volatile area of the law.
B. Real Property Law
The Kentucky Court of Appeals issued a different plea for ac-
tion, this time to the Kentucky Supreme Court, in the case of
72 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
73 635 S.W.2d at 318.
74 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
75 Id. at 268.
76 635 S.W.2d at 318. The Kentucky Supreme Court seems to be telling the General
Assembly that it considers the avoidance of the three serious problems listed in the text ac-
companying note 73, supra, as providing a strong state interest that may override the com-





Bishop v. Rueff. 78 In Bishop, the court of appeals gave effect to
land restrictions which were'not contained within a chain of title
or in any instrument which would customarily be checked to in-
sure a clear title.79 A concurring opinion by Judge Howerton
called for the Supreme Court "to bring the law regarding recip-
rocal negative easements and/or covenants running with the land
into the late twentieth century."' °
In Bishop, one neighbor had constructed a seven-foot high
wooden slab fence on the common boundary of the property.
The adjoining neighbor sought injunctive relief to bring the fence
into compliance with a restrictive covenant contained in her
deed which disallowed solid fences and fences over four feet in
height. 81 The tracts of land were originally owned by a common
grantor who had failed to place the restrictions in the deeds for
all the tracts. One large tract was sold to a developer without ac-
tual notice of the original restrictions. The large tract was subse-
quently subdivided and sold. None of the later deeds, including
the defendant's, mentioned or referred to the restrictions which
appeared in the plaintiffs deed. The neighbor who had con-
structed the offending fence was unaware of the restrictions until
the fence was substantially complete. The restrictions were in a
collateral chain of title, in a deed that a purchaser might have
little cause to search, and the offending neighbor did not have
actual notice of the restrictions. Nonetheless, the court of appeals
felt bound by Kentucky Supreme Court precedent 2 and found
78 619 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary rev. denied, No. 81-SC-471-D
(Ky. Sept. 15,1981).
79 Id. at 720.80 Id. at 722 (Howerton, J., concurring).
81 The aggrieved neighbor's deed contained the following restriction:
As a further consideration of this conveyance, it is hereby agreed that the
property herein conveyed shall be subject to the following restrictions:
No. 4. No solid board fence shall be erected on the property. Fencing, if any,
shall be of rail, picket or shrub. Fences, other than shrub, shall not exceed
four feet in height. It is further agreed that the restrictions hereinabove set
out shall apply to and affect all the remaining property of the [common
grantor].
Id. at 719.82 Id. at 72-21 (quoting McLean v. Thurman, 273 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Ky. 1954):
"[W]here the owners of two or more lots situated near one another convey one of the lots
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that the restrictive covenants ran with the land and were binding
on subsequent purchasers. 83
The basis of Judge Howerton's concurring opinion was that it
is unreasonable for a restriction recorded in a collateral chain of
title to constitute constructive notice to a purchaser.M According
to Judge Howerton, modern property law should move away
from the simplistic world of "Whiteacre" and "Blackacre'" to-
ward the world of one thousand-acre subdivisions divided into
several thousands of lots. In this situation, the difficulty in
searching collateral chains of title is apparent.I Judge Howerton
proposed that the common grantor be required to record sep-
arately an instrument containing any restrictions, thus placing
the restrictions in all chains of title that originate from the same
grantor. 8 The consequences of failing to file separately an instru-
ment containing such restrictions would be refusal to give effect
to the restrictions. A requirement such as this would be more
reasonable in terms of the time and expense of burdensome title
searches.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals also recently had occasion to
address the question of whether a bona fide purchaser of real
property from heirs of the former owner takes subject to the in-
terest of undisclosed heirs. Under Kentucky law, heirs to intes-
tate property must file an affidavit of descent before they can re-
cord a deed and convey the property.u In Sirls v. Jordan, the
filed affidavit of descent omitted three heirs at law of the dece-
dent. Regardless of this fact, the property was sold. The omitted
heirs brought suit against the purchasers to assert their interests.
with express restrictions applying thereto in favor of the land retained by the grantor, the
servitude becomes mutual, and during the period of restraint the owner of the lots re-
tained may do nothing that is forbidden to the owner of the lot sold."). See also Anderson
v. Henslee, 11 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1928).
1 619 S.W.2d at 721.
84 Id. at 722-23 (Howerton, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 723 (Howerton, J., concurring). The sheer number of titles that must be
searched to assure an unrestricted title is evidence enough of the problems associated with
having a restriction recorded in a collateral chain of title and of having such a recordation
constitute constructive notice.
86 Id.
87 KBS § 382.120 (1972).
8 625 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary rev. denied, No. 81-SC-799-D
(Ky. Jan. 6, 1982).
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Because a decedent's intestate real estate vests in the heirs at law
immediately upon his or her death, 9 and since a grantor can only
transfer by deed the title he or she holds,o the court concluded
that the conveying heirs could only warrant and convey the in-
terests they inherited from the decedent. 91 According to the
court, the recording of an affidavit of descent under the statute92
does not raise the recorded affidavit to the level of conclusive
proof of heirship. 91 Therefore, a purchaser of real property from
some of the heirs of the former owner must take subject to the in-
terest of any undisclosed heir. Once again, the General Assembly
needs to act to preclude future problems in the certification of
title. One possible solution is to raise the recording of an affidavit
of descent to the level of a conclusive presumption of heirship;
therefore, the purchasers would enjoy a status similar to that of a
bona fide purchaser. The omitted heirs would have a claim
against the selling heirs for their proportionate share of the pro-
ceeds from the property. At present, the purchasers have no pro-
tection except for breach of warranty against the selling heir.
Two other court of appeals cases are worth mentioning be-
cause of their oblique effect on the law of real property. In Ar-
thur v. Arthur,94 the court held that a sister state's courts may
compel a party to a divorce action in that state to convey land in
Kentucky. The Kentucky courts will enforce such a judgment if
equity, considering all the surrounding circumstances, so de-
mands.9s In Terry v. Castleton Farm,96 the court held that the in-
terest that accrues on an escrow account containing a down pay-
ment or deposit on the sale of real property belongs to the vendor
unless the parties otherwise contract. 17
89 Id. at 108 (citing Ryburn v. First Nat'l Bank of Mayfield, 399 S.W.2d 313 (Ky.
1965)).
90 625 S.W.2d at 108 (citing Vanhooser v. Fairchild, 141 S.W. 75 (Ky. 1911)). The
court also quoted KRS § 381.150 (1972): "A deed and warranty of land purporting to pass
or assure a greater right or estate than the person can lawfully pass or assure, shall operate
to convey on warrant so much of the right and estate as such person can lawfully convey."
Id.
91 Id.
02 See KRS § 382.120 (1972) which governs recordation of an affidavit of descent.
' 625 S.W.2d at 108.
14 625 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
I Id. at593.
96 618 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
7 Id. at 585.
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CONCLUSION
As the preceding Survey indicates, the recent developments
in Kentucky wills, probate and property law run the gamut from
clinging to Old English common law doctrines to whole-heart-
edly embracing new model code provisions. To legal practi-
tioners, the changes signal the need for corresponding adjust-
ments in their practice. To academicians, the changes represent
intellectual stimulation and challenge. Any change in the law, no
matter how insignificant it may seem, directly affects someone
whom the law did not affect in the same manner as before.
When considering the recent changes in Kentucky wills, probate
and property law, one should keep in mind that changes in the
law also are changes in people's lives.

